In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This 'Deep Version' of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship between citizens' political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions centre on whether a reasonable citizen's choice of political conception can be influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to religion.
2 draw and offer public reasons to justify their advocacy of, and votes for, laws relating to fundamental political questions, 2 and their comprehensive doctrines (including their religious beliefs). That relationship is the focus of this paper. I present two models of the relationship within what Gerald Gaus (2014) calls the 'Deep Version' of Rawlsian political liberalism, and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines.
The Deep Version of political liberalism recognises reasonable pluralism about justice, not merely about the good. There is a 'family' of reasonable political conceptions of justice, with different (reasonable) citizens accepting different members of that family. This raises the question that is the focus of this paper: can citizens' comprehensive doctrines permissibly influence their choice of political conception? For example, a Catholic citizen who believes that only men can be priests might on this basis reject any political conception that favours laws prohibiting male-only priesthoods. Similarly, a citizen who endorses liberation theology, so believes that God has a preferential concern for the poor, might on this basis endorse a political conception that calls for very high levels of redistribution. The
Permissive Model, as I call it, allows this. Citizens can choose their political conception of justice in light of their comprehensive doctrine. According to the Restrictive Model, however, this undermines the freestandingness of citizens' political conceptions, stymies political deliberation, and allows laws to be unacceptably shaped by comprehensive doctrines.
Citizens should develop their political conceptions in a freestanding way, insulated from the influence of their comprehensive doctrines.
I will argue that the Permissive Model is compatible with the core tenets of Rawlsian political liberalism and makes possible a more effective response to some of political liberalism's critics. 3 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I review the basic features of Rawlsian political liberalism, to show how our question arises. I then explain the Restrictive and Permissive Models in detail. Next, I consider five objections to the Permissive Model.
Each of these objections draws on some central value or purpose of Rawlsian political liberalism. I argue that the Permissive Model can be defended from these objections. Finally, I present two further considerations in favour of the Permissive Model, which give Rawlsian political liberals reason to accept it in favour of the Restrictive Model.
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Setting out the question: basic elements of the Rawlsian picture
Gaus has recently distinguished between the 'Shallow' and 'Deep' Versions of political liberalism. According to the former, there is reasonable pluralism about the good, due to the burdens of judgment, which are the 'many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment ' (p. 56) . 4 These include the facts that evidence is conflicting and complex, that values can be weighed in different ways, that concepts are vague, that our assessment of evidence is shaped by our total life experiences, and that different normative considerations often conflict (pp. 56-57) . For these reasons, the exercise of reason under free institutions leads to deep and irreconcilable disagreements over questions of the good, such that citizens endorse a great diversity of comprehensive doctrines. 5 The Shallow Version of political liberalism seeks to show that an overlapping consensus on a shared political conception of justice is nonetheless possible among all reasonable citizens.
Citizens are conceived as accepting two sets of values, a political set and a nonpolitical set. 6 While reasonable pluralism infects the non-political set, leading citizens to accept a variety of comprehensive doctrines, all reasonable citizens can come to share the 4 same account of the political set, so share a conception of justice. 'Citizens' overall views have two parts: one part can be seen to be, or coincide with, the publicly recognised political conception of justice; the other part is a (fully or partially) comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in some manner related ' (p. 38) . Some reasonable comprehensive doctrines provide support for the political conception, others are congruent with it, and still others at least avoid direct conflict with it (p. 140). 7 We thereby achieve a stable and wellordered liberal society, where 'everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice ' (p. 35) . The political set of values is itself derived from ideas implicit in the public political culture of liberal societies, particularly the idea 'of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal persons' (p. 9). The shared political conception interprets and orders the political values contained within this 'fundamental organising idea ' (p. 9 In order for a conception to 'fall under the category of the political' (p. 452), it must be the case that its 'principles apply to basic political and social institutions', that it 'can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind' (so is 'freestanding'), and that it 'can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a constitutional regime, such as the conceptions of citizens as free and equal persons, and of society as a fair system of cooperation ' (p. 453) . Conceptions with these three features contain only political values and apply only to political life, so do not directly compete with the non-political values of comprehensive doctrines. Being freestanding also means that a conception is not ineliminably tied to any one comprehensive doctrine, so citizens holding to different doctrines can accept it.
There is therefore a bounded set of reasonable political conceptions of justice, {C1, C2,..., Cn}. Each conception interprets and orders shared political values in a different way.
Given the range of possible interpretations and relative weights of political values this will be a large set, but it will nonetheless be limited, since every conception must have the six features that Rawls lists. This is necessary because reasonable political conceptions must be ones that all citizens can be reasonably expected to recognise as reasonable (p. 446) . This is an implication of the criterion of reciprocity, which states that citizens must be prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation, where fair terms are understood as ones that the citizen offering them can 'reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept ' (p. xlii, cf. 446) . Citizens who base their political action on a reasonable political conception fulfil this criterion, and thus offer one another public reasons, fulfilling their 'duty of civility ' (pp. 444-447 For instance, can she look at the policy implications of various conceptions and then choose the one that fits best with the policy views she derives from her comprehensive doctrine? Or must she work up her conception of justice without any reference to her comprehensive doctrine, bracketing out its influence at this stage in her reasoning?
The next section presents two models of the relationship between citizens' political and non-political sets of values, which give contrasting answers to these questions. This prevents citizens from drawing on public reasons in an ad hoc way. Without a complete conception of justice, a citizen might form her views on each political question by consulting her religious doctrine, and then appeal in her public advocacy to whatever public reasons happen to support her positions. Rawls is opposed to this.
One problem with 'ad hoc reasoning' is that it can lead to inconsistent uses of political values. Jane believes that her religion supports law L 1 , which restricts freedom in some way, and appeals to security, a political value, in order to provide public reasons for her 9 position. She opposes law L 2 , also on the basis of her religious views, despite L 2 restricting (similar amounts of) freedom for the sake of (similar amounts of) security. In her public advocacy against L 2 , Jane plays down the importance of security and emphasises the importance of freedom, in order to publicly justify her religiously-determined position. If
Jane endorsed a complete political conception and applied it consistently across the range of fundamental political questions, she would be forced to choose to either support or oppose both of L 1 and L 2 . Instead, she draws on public reasons in an inconsistent way in order to support positions she holds due to her religious beliefs. This is impermissible.
In some cases, of course, this kind of inconsistency might not arise. Citizens might find that they can form their views on particular issues by consulting their comprehensive doctrine, while appealing to public reasons in a fairly consistent way when providing public justifications for these positions. At the limit, they might implicitly affirm a complete political conception. Nonetheless, unless they form a complete conception of justice and use it consistently in their consideration of political questions, both models consider citizens to be violating the ideal of public reason. They are failing to guide their conduct by the ideal of offering terms of cooperation they can reasonably expect others to endorse.
The third similarity between the two models is that they follow Rawls's 'wide view' of public reason. Citizens may permissibly appeal to their comprehensive doctrines to support their political positions, subject to the proviso that they offer sufficient public reasons in due course (pp. 462-464). Offering non-public reasons alongside public ones might even have beneficial effects, since it shows other citizens how one's comprehensive doctrine and political conception cohere, so reassures them that one is reasonable and sincere in one's public justifications (Boettcher 2005, p. 130 ).
The desire for citizens' comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions to cohere is the final thing the models share. Citizens are not called to compartmentalise their lives and 10 ignore their comprehensive doctrines when they enter the political sphere. Their conception of justice should be distinct from their comprehensive doctrine, yet consistent with it. Even on the Restrictive Model, citizens should accommodate their political conception within their broader worldview.
How the models differ
The disagreement between the models concerns precisely how this coherence between political conceptions and comprehensive doctrines comes about. The difference between the models, therefore, concerns the considerations that citizens are permitted to draw on when determining which political conception of justice in set {C 1 , C 2 ,..., C n } they believe is most reasonable.
To make things clearer, consider the case of Betty. As an orthodox Catholic, Betty believes that only men can be priests. Assume that some reasonable political conceptions endorse laws that prohibit male-only priesthoods, on equality grounds, while other reasonable conceptions weigh the value of freedom of association more highly, so permit such priesthoods. 13 Betty has a theological objection to laws prohibiting male-only priesthoods, and for that reason will not endorse any political conception that favours such laws. She believes that those conceptions allow equality to outweigh freedom of association too easily.
She rejects conception C 1 on this basis. Betty ultimately comes to accept a complete, reasonable political conception, C 2 , that permits male-only priesthoods. She bases her political advocacy on this conception, so offers public reasons for (and against) laws (on this issue, and more generally).
We should be clear that Betty accepts and is motivated by the ideal of public reason.
She believes that she must offer her compatriots reasons that she can reasonably expect them to accept. She recognises that reasonable pluralism means that no religious reasons fulfil this criterion, and that she must form a reasonable political conception and base her political advocacy upon it. This is why she engages in the process of reasoning that leads her to Further, Rawls's primary concern here is that political conceptions are complete, so are frameworks of thought giving reasonable judgments on every fundamental political question. This prevents citizens from reasoning in an ad hoc way, simply finding public reasons that support whatever policies their comprehensive doctrine endorses. As we saw earlier, both models view this as impermissible. Rawls's next paragraph shows that this is his focus:
'What we cannot do in public reason is to proceed directly from our comprehensive doctrine, or a part thereof, to one or several political principles and values, and the particular institutions they support. Instead we are required to first work to the basic ideas of a complete political conception and from there to elaborate its principles and ideals, and to use the arguments they provide' (p. 455).
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The Permissive Model concurs. Citizens should first work out a complete political conception, using both public and non-public reasons to decide between competing reasonable conceptions, before applying that conception within their political advocacy. Betty takes her Catholic faith into account from the start, allowing it to influence her evaluation of competing reasonable political conceptions, and therefore accepts C 2 (and its freestanding justification). In this case, in particular, it might seem insincere for Betty to present arguments based on C 2 as sufficient to justify her opposition to L 1 .
Defenders of the Permissive Model can endorse the sincerity requirement, however, and insist that Betty's deliberation should indeed be sincere. Betty should be open and honest in her deliberation with Alf, and so admit that she has religious reasons for rejecting C 1 and favouring C 2 . She also accepts the freestanding justification for C 2 , however, and so is not insincere in offering that justification to Alf. She offers Alf public reasons against L 1 that she accepts, reasons drawn from C 2 , and can offer a freestanding justification for C 2 that she also accepts. She should be open about the fact that she also has religious reasons to favour C 2 over C 1 .
One might think that the strength of this response depends on whether Betty knows that her Catholicism is pivotal in her endorsement of C 2 . If she does, then she knows that had she first engaged in freestanding reasoning then she would have endorsed C 1 . It is therefore 21 insincere for her to claim that C 2 is the most reasonable political conception, or to endorse its freestanding justification, since she really believes that C 1 is the most reasonable conception, on purely political grounds. This is mistaken, however. Betty is certainly sincere if she does not know that her
Catholicism is pivotal, but I think she is still being sincere if she does know this. She believes that C 2 is the most reasonable political conception, all things considered -that it is the most plausible and well-justified interpretation and ordering of political values, and one that provides reasons that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. Further, in actuality Betty does accept the freestanding justification for C 2 . She believes that C 2 contains the most reasonable weighting of the political values, and that all citizens can recognise C 2 as reasonable on freestanding grounds, and this is crucial to her own endorsement of C 2 . She would reject C 2 if it could not be accepted by non-Catholics. Given that it can be, she can sincerely endorse C 2 and its freestanding justification, and offer those arguments to Alf, while also acknowledging that she has further religious reasons which explain her own endorsement of C 2 as the most reasonable political conception. She sincerely believes that L 1 should not be enacted, and that her arguments against L 1 can be accepted by all reasonable citizens. She is thus sincerely presenting public reasons in her political advocacy.
Legitimacy
A final objection to the Permissive Model is that the influence it allows comprehensive doctrines to have over citizens' choice of political conception directly undermines legitimacy. We can draw a further distinction here between Betty's religion causing her (and others like her) to recognise the weight of the freestanding argument for C 2 , and Betty taking her religion to itself provide reasons for her to endorse C 2 . It might be that while she would have originally endorsed C 1 based on freestanding reasoning, her Catholicism causes her to recognise weakness in the argument for C 1 , and that it underestimates the weight of freedom of association, which tells in favour of C 2 . In this case, her religion is helping her to recognise the independent weight of the public reasons in favour of C 2 . Alternatively, Betty might take her Catholicism to directly provide reasons for rejecting C 1 and accepting C 2 , and accept the freestanding justification for C 2 only because she already endorses that conception. In this case, she would cease to endorse C 2 if she became an atheist, since she would cease to have religious reasons in its favour. Some advocates of the Restrictive Model might consider the 23 former case permissible. They would certainly object to the latter case, however, since here Betty's religion is crucial to her endorsement of C 2 , and this threatens to undermine legitimacy. The Permissive Model allows both cases.
I do not think that this shows that we should reject the Permissive Model, however.
Even if Betty's Catholicism is pivotal, and even if she takes it as providing reasons in favour of C 2 , she still endorses a reasonable political conception for which there is a freestanding justification that she accepts and can offer Alf. The fact that she finds that justification plausible in part due to her already having religious reasons for C 2 is a normal part of the process of reflective equilibrium. Comprehensive doctrines should be permitted to play the role within reflective equilibrium that the Permissive Model allows them to play precisely because citizens like Betty can fully satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, offering others reasons they can reasonably expect them to accept. Alf can recognise that C 2 is a freestanding, reasonable political conception, providing public reasons for and against laws.
He can thus accept that laws that are enacted, or defeated, by appeal to C 2 are legitimate. The fact that some citizens endorse C 2 partly based on their comprehensive doctrines does not undermine this. What matters is that C 2 is a reasonable political conception, providing terms of cooperation that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse.
It is important to reemphasise here that Betty is motivated by the ideal of public reason. It is not the case that she just happens to end up endorsing a reasonable political conception, so happens to act in conformity with public reason, without actually being guided or motivated by that ideal. Betty endorses the ideal of public reason, and is committed to acting politically on the basis of a reasonable political conception, in order to offer to others reasons that they can reasonably be expected to endorse. If no reasonable political conceptions permitted male-only priesthoods then she certainly would accept a conception that prohibited them, and would vote in favour of prohibitive laws. She considers it vitally 24 important that there is a freestanding justification for C 2 , showing that all citizens can recognise it as reasonable, and that she accepts that justification and offers it to Alf, while also being open about the influence of her comprehensive doctrine. The fact that counterfactually she would endorse C 1 instead is, in my view, neither here nor there. In actuality she accepts a reasonable political conception, offers a freestanding justification for it, and supports laws on the basis of it, so on the basis of public reasons. The influence of her comprehensive doctrine in her reasoning about political values does not undermine any of this, or prevent her from fulfilling her duty of civility. It thus does not threaten the legitimacy of political outcomes.
Considerations in favour of the Permissive Model
The previous section argued that the Permissive Model is fully consistent with many of the core values and aims of Rawlsian political liberalism. In this final section I will present two further considerations that count in favour of the Permissive Model: the facts that it is psychologically more realistic and that it can allay integrity objections to political liberalism.
Psychological realism (and stability)
According to It is logically possible for one to set aside all of one's comprehensive beliefs when reasoning about political values and seeking to determine which interpretations best embody the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens. This is extremely demanding, however. It is not something we can expect most citizens to accomplish. 24 As Biggar implies, the Permissive Model is inevitable, or at least much more psychologically realistic. While such psychological considerations are not decisive, they are a relevant factor in choosing between competing accounts of legitimacy, so this gives us some reason to prefer the Permissive Model.
The work of another theologian, David Hollenbach, provides a useful example here.
Based on his Catholic faith, Hollenbach (2002, p. 68) argues for a politics centred on 'an understanding of the common good of a pluralist society,' because the good of individuals, including their freedom, can only be realised through social institutions and relationships.
'Any good of a person that is a real good…is embedded in the good of the community.
Conversely, any common good that is a real good is simultaneously the good of persons' (Hollenbach 2002, p. 79) . This might sound perfectionist, but Hollenbach's commitment to 26 the 'common good' proves to amount to an endorsement of something like a Rawlsian conception of justice. For example, in his discussion of poverty and distributive justice he emphasises the need for all to have adequate resources for genuine participation in society, so that the basic structure embodies solidarity and reciprocity. 'Justice calls for the minimal level of solidarity required to enable all of society's members to live with basic dignity' (Hollenbach 2002, p. 192) . The policy implications of this include pursuing fair equality of opportunity and lowering structural and economic barriers that prevent the poor from sharing in the common good. While Hollenbach's arguments are shaped by his religious beliefs and expressed in religiously-inspired language, his view of justice might well fall within the family of reasonable political conceptions.
According to Weithman (2010, pp. 323-335 
Integrity
The Permissive Model also has one final benefit, which I mentioned in my introduction: it defuses many of the integrity concerns pressed by opponents of political liberalism. Biggar's claim about citizens' metanarratives shaping their understanding of shared political values is not merely about psychological realism. More importantly, it points to the fact that many citizens consider this to be a part of their comprehensive commitments, so believe they are morally obligated to base their understanding of political justice on their comprehensive doctrine (Wolterstorff 1997, p. 105) . 26 The Permissive Model allows them to do so, rather than requiring them to engage in a form of freestanding reasoning that they would consider an objectionable strain on their integrity. Citizens are encouraged to have an 'integrated existence', while remaining within the constraints of public reason.
Of course, those constraints mean that the Permissive Model still demands that 28 citizens give up any ambitions to comprehensively structure laws and institutions on the basis of their comprehensive doctrine. Citizens must also exercise restraint, refraining from supporting laws for which their only reasons are non-public. Citizens will sometimes have comprehensive reasons in favour of laws that their political conception cannot justify. The duty of civility demands that they do not seek the enactment of such laws. This is the cost of living in a free, pluralistic, society. But it is a cost that many citizens will be willing to pay, and falls far short of the gross restrictions on religious freedom that some critics have accused 10. i.e. the exercise of political power is 'fully proper ' (p. 137) . This is a lower standard than justice, but a related one (pp. 427-428).
11. Quong's view of the overlapping consensus is a version of the Restrictive Model, but could be amended to fit with the Permissive Model. For criticism of Quong's view, see Zoffoli (2012) .
12. This points to a third model, under which citizens must form a political conception in a freestanding way, but can then move to a different conception if they find that it fits better with their comprehensive doctrine. It is likely that the political conception a citizen moves to in this case will be close to the first conception, so the stage of freestanding reasoning is still independently important. In effect, a citizen would narrow down to a subset of reasonable conceptions based on freestanding reasoning, and comprehensive considerations would then determine the precise conception she accepts. While this is a distinct model, it is closer to the Permissive Model in terms of its implications for the relationship between political conceptions and comprehensive doctrines. The arguments for and against the Permissive Model also apply to this third model, which seems to be endorsed by Macedo (2010) .
13. If you consider this implausible then feel free to replace the example with an equivalent of your own. I sketch arguments for this claim later in the paper.
14. I am not endorsing this argument. My claim is simply that it appears reasonable, not that it is necessarily correct, or the best understanding of political values.
15. Or some other reasonable political conception that permits male-only priesthoods.
16. An even more permissive model could hold that it does not matter whether Betty accepts the freestanding justification for C 2 , as long as such a justification exists (and, perhaps, that she knows this), so that C 2 is a reasonable political conception, providing public reasons. I think that Rawls would reject this model, however, due to his views of freestandingness, completeness, and publicity. My 'Permissive Model' is the most permissive that Rawls would allow.
17. I was first led to think about the issues explored in this paper by a discussion between Kevin 23. Hollenbach (2002, pp. 166-168 ) makes a somewhat similar argument.
24. Indeed, forming a complete political conception and applying it consistently across all fundamental political questions is itself very demanding.
25. This is reminiscent of Hollenbach's view.
26. Hollenbach's work is again a pertinent example.
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